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An Iron Fist or Kid Gloves: American
Insurance Association v. Garamendi and the
Fate of the Federal Monopoly on Foreign
Policy
J. Matthew Saunders*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Prior to and during the Second World War, the Nazi
government of Germany engaged in the wide scale theft of
insurance policies held by Jews throughout Europe. In American
Insurance Assín v. Garamendi, the United States Supreme Court
struck down Californiaís Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act
(HVIRA), a statute aimed at helping Holocaust victims and their
heirs settle claims against insurance companies by forcing the
insurance companies to disclose information about policies sold
in Europe between 1920 and 1945.1 In a five-four decision, the
Court ruled that the HVIRA conflicted with the federal policy of
settling the claims through diplomatic channels.2 Justice Souter,
writing for the majority, stated:
California seeks to use an iron fist where the President has
consistently chosen kid gloves. We have heard powerful
arguments that the iron fist would work better, and it may be
that if the matter of compensation were considered in isolation
from all other issues involving the European allies, the iron fist
would be the preferable policy. But our thoughts on the
efficacy of the one approach versus the other are beside the
point, since our business is not to judge the wisdom of the
National Governmentís policy. . . .3

Almost immediately, representatives of the Jewish community
called the decision ìtragicî4 and ìa crushing blow to the victims of
*

J.D. Candidate, Chapman University School of Law, 2005; M.M.C., The University of South Carolina
School of Journalism and Mass Communications, 1999; B.A., Vanderbilt University, 1997. The author
would like to thank Lara Saunders for her unwavering support and unending patience.
1 American Ins. Assín. v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 2379 (2003).
2 Id. at 2390.
3 Id. at 2393.
4 Charles Lane, Court Rejects Law Aiding Survivors of Holocaust; Calif. Act
Undercut Presidential Role, Ruling Says, WASH. POST, June 24, 2003, at A11.
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the Holocaust.î5
Furthermore, the Courtís decision in Garamendi reaches
beyond the rights of Holocaust survivors. It has muddied the
waters in an increasingly murky area of constitutional lawóthe
nature of the federal monopoly on foreign policy. Californiaís
legislature felt compelled to act because, as stated in the HVIRA,
ì[a]t least 5,600 documented Holocaust survivors are living in
California today. Many of these survivors and their descendents
have been fighting for over 50 years to persuade insurance
companies to settle unpaid or wrongfully paid claims.î6 The
California legislature enacted HVIRA in a legitimate aim to
eliminate ìthe further victimization of these policyholders and
their families.î7 The Supreme Courtís striking down of the
HVIRA throws a glaring spotlight on the problem of determining
where state authority ends in an increasingly interconnected
global society. So far, the Supreme Court has provided little
guidance to the states or the courts below as to what states can
and cannot do in the global arena.8
That the federal government holds a monopoly on foreign
policy was once a given, but in its application this idea has come
under fire. As one commentator has remarked, ì[m]ost everyone
was comfortable supposing that the national government
monopolized foreign relations until the Supreme Court actually
began applying that notion.î9 Garamendi follows more than half
a century of confusing and contradictory Supreme Court cases
It
concerning this federal monopoly on foreign policy.10
represents a retreat from the ideas put forward in these cases,
but it resolves none of the issues involved. In fact, in Garamendi,
the Court fell into many of the same traps as it had in its
previous jurisprudence, including having to infer what exactly
the federal foreign policy was and to decide whether Congress or
the President had ultimate authority over that foreign policy.
Furthermore, on the ultimate question of whether there is any
room at all for state action in the foreign policy realm, the Court
remained silent. Thus, Garamendi gives little assistance to those
who hoped it would clarify the role of the states on the global
5

at B1.

Henry Weinstein, Holocaust Insurance Law Negated, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2003,

CAL. INS. CODE ß 13801(d) (Deering Supp. 2003).
Id. ß 13801(e).
Emily Chiang, Think Locally, Act Globally? Dormant Federal Common Law
Preemption of State and Local Activities Affecting Foreign Affairs, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV.
923, 925 (2003).
9 Edward T. Swaine, The Undersea World of Foreign Relations Federalism, 2 CHI. J.
INTíL L. 337, 339 (2001) [hereinafter Swaine, Foreign Relations Federalism].
10 Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant
Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L. J. 1127, 1135 [hereinafter Swaine, Negotiating Federalism].
6
7
8
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stage.
Part II of this Note explores the three prevailing theories in
support of the federal monopoly on foreign policy: the dormant
federal foreign affairs power, the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause, and direct preemption.11 Part III discusses Garamendi
and the opinions of both the majority and the dissent. Part IV
explores the problems with the Supreme Courtís ruling. Part V
posits a solution to the unresolved issues faced in Garamendi,
which involves recognizing a constitutional basis for the federal
monopoly on foreign policy but limiting its application. Part VI
concludes this Note with observations on the legal basis for the
federal governmentís authority to conduct foreign policy and the
future of state activity in the international arena.
II. THREE THEORIES ON THE SOURCE OF THE FEDERAL
MONOPOLY ON FOREIGN POLICY
A.

The Dormant Federal Foreign Affairs Power

Under the theory of the dormant federal foreign affairs
power, one of the three prevailing theories on the source of the
federal monopoly on foreign policy, any state law that has a
direct impact on the federal governmentís ability to conduct
foreign policy is invalid.12 The dormant federal foreign affairs
power has its roots in several Supreme Court cases from the
early to mid-twentieth century. In United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., the Supreme Court upheld a joint resolution
of Congress giving power to the President to outlaw the sale of
arms to combatants embroiled in a conflict in Bolivia and
Paraguay.13 Justice Sutherland, writing for the majority, said,
ì[t]he broad statement that the federal government can exercise
no powers except those specifically enumerated in the
Constitution, and such implied powers as are necessary and
proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is
categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs.î14 He
went on to explain that in his view, ìthe states severally never
possessed international powers,î and that this power originated

11 The term ìpreemptionî is often used, and not incorrectly, to describe all three
doctrines. The dormant foreign affairs power and the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
are forms of field preemption; the federal government having intended to occupy the
entire field of foreign affairs under these doctrines. The direct preemption theory
envisions instances of conflict preemption, both explicit and implied. This note attempts
to avoid confusion by using ìpreemptionî to refer only to such conflict preemption.
12 Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 10, at 1144.
13 299 U.S. 304, 329 (1936).
14 Id. at 315-16.
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in the states acting as a union.15 Therefore, ì[a]s a member of
the family of nations, the right and power of the United States in
that field are equal to the right and power of the other members
of the international family. Otherwise, the United States is not
completely sovereign.î16 In other words, there was no room for
state action.
A few years later, in Hines v. Davidowitz, the Supreme Court
struck down a Pennsylvania law that provided for the
registration of immigrants within the state.17 In doing so the
Court said, ì[t]he Federal Government, representing as it does
the collective interests of the [then] forty-eight states, is
entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of
affairs with foreign sovereignties.î18 Furthermore, the Court
stated, ìfor national purposes, embracing our relations with
foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.î19
The federal foreign affairs power doctrine crystallized,
however, during the height of the Cold War. In Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the Court, in ruling that the Cuban
government had standing to sue in United States courts,
integrated international law into federal common law. 20 The
Court reasoned that the ìconcern for uniformity in this countryís
dealings with foreign nationsî that is manifested in various
clauses of the Constitution indicated ìa desire to give matters of
international significance to the jurisdiction of federal
institutions.î21 Therefore, it would be inappropriate for a federal
court to apply state common law to an issue implicating
international law.
Sabbatino paved the way for Zschernig v. Miller four years
later, in which perhaps the most direct embodiment of the
dormant foreign affairs power appears.22 In Zschernig, the
Supreme Court struck down an Oregon law prohibiting a citizen
of a foreign country from claiming an inheritance from a resident
of Oregon unless certain conditions were met.23 These conditions
were meant to ensure the existence of reciprocity in inheritance
rights between the United States and other nations and required
foreign nationals to prove that this reciprocity existed.24
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Id. at 316.
Id. at 318.
312 U.S. 52, 73-74 (1941).
Id. at 63.
Id. (quoting The Chinese Exclusion Cases, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889)).
376 U.S. 398, 426-27 (1964).
Id. at 427 n.25.
389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968); Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 10, at 1143.
389 U.S. at 441.
Id. at 430-31.
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Furthermore, the law required foreign nationals to demonstrate
that they could take property from an Oregon estate ìwithout
confiscation.î25
Although the law as written applied to all nations, the Court
found that in implementing it, probate judges regularly
disfavored citizens of Communist countries.26 They went beyond
simply determining whether reciprocity existed and sought ìto
ascertain whether ërightsí protected by foreign law are the same
ërightsí that citizens of Oregon enjoy.î27 If a right in question
implicated a Communist-controlled state agency, then judges
ruled that the right was not the same and that there was no
reciprocity.28 Most troubling for the Supreme Court was the
reference in the Oregon law to ìconfiscation,î which ìled into
minute inquiries concerning the actual administration of foreign
law, into the credibility of foreign diplomatic statements,î and
into speculation as to whether inherited goods were actually
delivered to the rightful heirs.29
This level of involvement was too much for the Court even
though no treaty or federal law addressed the issue. Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority, stated that ìeven in absence of
a treaty, a Stateís policy may disturb foreign relations.î30 The
Oregon law had ìa direct impact upon foreign relationsî and
negatively affected the federal governmentís ability to conduct
foreign policy.31 By contrast, the Supreme Court upheld a
similar reciprocity agreement in California, which relied on the
statement of foreign ambassadors to prove reciprocity, because it
only had ìsome incidental or indirect effect in foreign
countries.î32
A major criticism of the decision in Zschernig is that the
Court lacked direct support for its statements, relying on dicta
from Curtiss-Wright and Hines.33 Because of this and because of
the focus on Communist countries, the tendency has been to
relegate Zschernig to the status of Cold War relic.34 Today, few
adhere fully to the reasoning of Curtiss-Wright, and, without
express language in the Constitution, a treaty, or federal statute,
the Court has been reluctant to confer power to the federal
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Id.
Id. at 440.
Id.
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440.
Id. at 435.
Id. at 441.
Id.
Id. at 433 (quoting Clark v. Allen, 311 U.S. 503, 517 (1947)).
Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 10, at 1142-43.
Id. at 1145.
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government at the expense of the states.35 However, in light of
the heightened tensions of the time, the Zschernig decision made
sense. The Oregon law struck down in Zschernig did have the
potential to spark an international incident, and the Courtís
expression of the dormant foreign affairs poweróthat a state law
ìwith a direct impact upon foreign relationsî was
unconstitutionalóreflected this reality.36
Despite the lack of direct support in the Constitution for a
federal monopoly on foreign policy, proponents of the dormant
foreign affairs power can point to numerous constitutional
Article I, Section 8 gives
provisions for substantiation.37
Congress power ì[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations. . . ;
[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the
High Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations;î and ì[t]o
declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.î38 Article II,
Section 2 makes the President ìCommander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several
States;î and gives him the power to make treaties and appoint
ambassadors, and to receive ambassadors.39 Furthermore, the
Supremacy Clause, located at Article VI, Section 4, states, ì[t]his
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . and all
Treaties made . . . under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land. . . .î40 Finally, Article I, Section
10 bars the states from entering into any ìtreaty, alliance, or
Still, critics point out that while these
confederation.î41
provisions give the federal government broad power over foreign
policy, it is far from clear that they impart exclusive power.42
The only other arguments available to advocates of the
dormant foreign affairs power are historical and pragmatic
During the Articles of Confederation period, the
ones.43
independent actions of several states led to disastrous results,
including the disruption of much-needed trade with Great
Britain.44 The writings of Alexander Hamilton and James
Madison in The Federalist Papers are often cited to support the
proposition that the federal government needs unfettered control
35
36

Id. at 1142, 1150.
Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1241-42

37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Chiang, supra note 8, at 933.
U.S. CONST. art I, ß 8.
U.S. CONST. art II, ßß 2-3.
U.S. CONST. art VI, ß 4.
U.S. CONST. art I, ß 10.
Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 10, at 1135.
Id.
Chiang, supra note 8, at 938.

(1999).
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over the foreign affairs of the nation.45 Hamilton wrote, ìThe
interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States,
contrary to the true spirit of the Union, have, in different
instances, given just cause of umbrage and complaint to [other
nations],î and that these regulations needed to be restrained by a
ìnational controlî or else they ìwould be multiplied and extended
till they became not less serious sources of animosity and discord
than injurious impediments to the intercourse between the
different parts of the Confederacy.î46 In addition, Madison wrote,
ìIf we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in
respect to other nations.î47 Many have argued that this danger
has not diminished over time. To permit the states to conduct
their own foreign policies would be to invite chaos, since the
actions of one state could disrupt foreign relations for the whole
nation.48
Critics, however, argue that increased globalization has
given the states much greater direct access to the world at large
and that foreign entities understand that a single state does not
always speak for the whole nation.49 They point out that
individual states have always involved themselves in
international matters to some extent. They ìestablish offices
overseas, launch trade and investment missions, sign bilateral
and multilateral agreements, and participate in international
summits.î50 Denying the individual states any voice in foreign
policy therefore runs contrary to the realities of a global
marketplace.
Since the Zschernig decision the Supreme Court has not
applied the direct impact doctrine, leaving its value as precedent
in some doubt.51 However, the Court also has never overruled
Zschernig, and many lower courts have embraced the ìdirect
impactî test it propounds.52 For example, in Deutsch v. Turner
Corp., the Ninth Circuit applied the Zschernig ìdirect impactî
test to a California law aimed at corporations who employed
slave labor in Europe and Asia prior to and during World War
II.53 The law was enacted at the same time as the HVIRA and
allowed victims of slave labor to sue for compensation for the
45
46

1961).

Id. at 936-37.
THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 144-45 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed.,

THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961).
Chiang, supra note 8, at 957.
Id. at 956.
Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 10, at 1130.
Id. at 1145.
Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1617, 1632 (1997).
53 324 F.3d 692, 709 (9th Cir. 2003).
47
48
49
50
51
52
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work they were forced to do.54 The court invalidated the
California law because, in its estimation, the federal government
had exclusive power in foreign policy, especially concerning the
ability to wage war and to negotiate an end to war.55 The court
stated that ìthe Supreme Court has long viewed the foreign
affairs powers specified in the text of the Constitution as
reflections of a generally applicable constitutional principle that
power over foreign affairs is reserved to the federal
government.î56 Because so many lower courts have adopted the
ìdirect impactî rule, it would seem appropriate for the Supreme
Court to flesh out the doctrine, but so far the Court has refused
to do so.
B.

The Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause

The dormant Foreign Commerce Clause doctrine derives its
legitimacy from the Interstate Commerce Clause in Article II,
Section 8 of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power to
regulate commerce both among the states and with foreign
nations, and from the Import-Export Clause in Article II, Section
10, which prohibits states from laying duties on imports or
exports without congressional consent.57 The rationale of the
doctrine is identical to that of the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine.58 A state action is invalid if it intrudes into the field of
foreign commerce, even if Congress has not yet chosen to
regulate a particular matter in that area.
Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, a case in which the
Supreme Court overturned a tax imposed by California on
foreign-owned cargo containers in California ports, set out the
test for whether a state law violates the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause.59 According to Japan Line, if the state law in
question prevents the federal government from ìspeak[ing] with
one voice,î it is unconstitutional.60
The Supreme Court further developed the ìone voiceî
standard in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board.61 In
Barclays Bank, several multinational corporations filed suit
alleging that the worldwide combined reporting method
employed by the State of California to calculate corporate

54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ß 354.6 (Deering Supp. 2003).
Deutsch, 324 F.3d at 711.
Id. at 709.
Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 10, at 1146-48.
Id. at 1146.
441 U.S. 434, 453-54 (1979).
Id. at 449.
512 U.S. 298 (1994).
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franchise taxes unfairly taxed foreign-based multinational
corporations twice.62 The corporations claimed that the worldwide combined reporting method violated the Commerce Clause
and the Due Process Clause.63 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the
majority, dismissed most of the corporationsí claims because the
world wide combined reporting method was ìproper and fair.î64
Furthermore, the worldwide combined reporting method did not
ìinevitablyî lead to double taxation, and other methods of
calculating corporate taxes were just as susceptible to the
dangers of double taxation.65
The Supreme Courtís inquiry did not end there, however. In
light of Japan Line, the Court investigated whether Californiaís
method impaired the federal governmentís ìcapacity to speak
with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments.î66 The Court held that Congress, while aware of
foreign opposition to the worldwide combined reporting method,
had chosen not to forbid the states to employ it.67 Numerous bills
that would have prohibited use of the worldwide combined
reporting method were defeated.68 In addition, the Senate, in
ratifying a treaty with the United Kingdom, deleted a provision
of the treaty that would have precluded use of the method.69 The
Court also defended the California practice against opposition by
the Executive Branch, discounting executive statements on the
grounds that the Constitution conferred the power to regulate
foreign commerce to the Legislative Branch.70 As the Court
stated, ì[W]e leave it to Congressówhose voice, in this area, is
the Nationísóto evaluate whether the national interest is best
served by tax uniformity, or state autonomy.î71 Thus when
Congress and the President differ, Congress prevails in matters
of foreign commerce.72
Some hailed Barclays Bank as a victory for state power to
determine foreign policy, at least on a limited basis. However,
the decision still gave the ultimate power over foreign policy to a
branch of the federal government, in this case Congress, which
happened to have compatible views with California.73 In this
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id. at 302.
Id.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 319.
Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 311 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 324.
Id. at 325-26.
Id. at 326-27.
Id. at 329.
Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 331.
Id. at 329-30.
Chiang, supra note 8, at 954.
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way, the ìone voiceî test becomes virtually identical to the ìdirect
impactî test under the dormant foreign affairs power theory, and
is thus susceptible to the same criticisms.74 Very little textual
justification exists for granting Congress such power in
situations where positive law enactments are absent.75
Furthermore, because Japan Line, Barclays Bank, and the other
cases using the ìone voiceî analysis all have to do with tax issues,
the applicability of this test may very well be limited to foreign
tax disputes.76 At any rate, it is clear that the development of the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause adds yet another layer of
complexity to the question of the federal monopoly on foreign
policy: namely, whether the monopoly belongs to Congress, the
President, or both.77
C.

Direct Preemption

At the core of the direct preemption theory lies the
Supremacy Clause, which states that the Constitution, federal
laws, and treaties are ìthe supreme Law of the Land. . . any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.î78 Thus, ì[s]tate and local measures touching
on foreign affairs clearly cannot be maintained in the teeth of
enacted federal lawóincluding, at a minimum, federal statutes,
treaties, and congressionally authorized regulations.î79 There is
nothing controversial about this idea, which is fundamental to
the functioning of the federal government. A state law which
conflicts with a federal law, either expressly or by implication, is
unconstitutional, regardless of its subject matter. The issue then
is determining when a conflict occurs.
In United States v. Pink, the Supreme Court overturned
several New York laws directed against the Soviet Union.80 The
laws, passed after the 1917 Revolution in Russia and the
nationalization of the Russian insurance industry, denied the
claims of the Soviet Union to assets of Russian insurance
companies established in the state of New York prior to the
Bolshevik takeover.81 However, in 1933 the United States
officially recognized the Soviet Union, and the Soviet government
assigned its claims to the United States for collection.82 The
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 10, at 1148.
Id. at 1156.
Goldsmith, supra note 52, at 1637.
Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 10, at 1156-57.
U.S. CONST. art VI, ß 4.
Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 10, at 1141.
315 U.S. 203, 234 (1942).
Id. at 210-11.
Id. at 211.
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United States brought suit to acquire the New York assets.83 The
Supreme Court ruled that the agreement between the United
States and the Soviet Union was valid and, relying on the
Supremacy Clause, recognized the Presidentís power to negotiate
agreements with foreign governments.84 The Court stated that
ìinternational compacts and agreementsî have the same binding
force on the courts as treaties, and, therefore, state actions in
conflict with such agreements are invalid.85
More recently, the Supreme Court applied the idea of direct
preemption in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council.86 In
1996 the Commonwealth of Massachusetts adopted a law entitled
ìAn Act Regulating State Contracts with Companies Doing
Business with or in Burma (Myanmar)î (ìMassachusetts Actî).87
The law prohibited state entities from doing business with
organizations that also did business with the government of
Myanmar and was enacted in response to the atrocious human
rights violations of the military junta in power.88
Three months after the Massachusetts law went into effect,
Congress passed the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act (ìFederal Actî).89 Among
other provisions, the Federal Act authorized the President to
apply sanctions directly on the government of Myanmar.90 It also
gave him the power to inhibit ìnew investmentî by American
entities in Myanmar and to explore diplomatic avenues ìto bring
democracy to and improve human rights practices and the
quality of life in [Myanmar].î91 The motivations for the Federal
Act were similar to those of the Massachusetts Act.92
The National Foreign Trade Council, representing several
business organizations adversely affected by the Massachusetts
Act, filed suit in 1998.93 The District Court granted a permanent
injunction against the Massachusetts Act, stating that it
ìunconstitutionally impinged on the federal governmentís
exclusive authority to regulate foreign affairs.î94 The First
Circuit affirmed on the grounds that the Massachusetts Act
Id. at 213.
Id. at 230.
Pink, 315 U.S. at 230.
530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000).
Id. at 366-67 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 7 ßß 22G-22M (2002)).
Crosby, 530 U.S. at 367; Chiang, supra note 8, at 928.
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, ß 570, 110 Stat. 3009-166 (1996).
90 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 369.
91 Id.
92 See id. at 370; supra text accompanying note 88.
93 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 370-71.
94 Id. at 371 (alteration in original).
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
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violated the dormant foreign affairs power, the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause, and was preempted by the Federal Act.95
The Supreme Court, however, affirmed the First Circuitís
decision solely on the preemption ground.96 Justice Souter,
writing for the unanimous Court, stated that the Massachusetts
Act was ìan obstacle to the accomplishment of Congressís full
objectives under the [F]ederal Actî and that ìthe state law
undermines the intended purpose and ënatural effectí of at least
three provisions of the [F]ederal Act . . . .î97 In explaining the
Courtís reasoning, he noted the difference between the two Acts.
In many ways, the Massachusetts Act was much harsher than
the Federal Act, and the Court feared that it would hamper the
Presidentís ability to implement the provisions of the Federal
Act, especially its diplomatic components.98
Direct preemption is the least controversial of the three
because it has clear constitutional support. However, in limiting
the Crosby holding to direct preemption, the court deliberately
closed off any discussion of the dormant federal foreign affairs
power or the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause and
disappointed those who had hoped for some clarification of the
meaning and continued relevance of Zschernig and Barclays
Bank.99 This disappointment reflects the major shortcoming of
the direct preemption approach, a shortcoming that in many
ways spurred the Zschernig decision in the first place. There is
not always a federal law or treaty in direct conflict with a state
action, but in some way, it is clear that a state action intrudes
into the ability of the federal government to conduct foreign
policy freely. In such a situation, the direct preemption approach
will not work to alleviate the problem, and the only options open
to the courts are doctrines on which the Supreme Court has not
commented.100
III. AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION V. GARAMENDI ñ A
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Factual Background

Insurance policies and annuities were widely popular
investments among Jews in Europe prior to the Second World

95
96
97
98
99
100

Id.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 373.
Crosby, 530 U.S. at 376-77.
Id. at 374 n.8; Swaine, Foreign Relations Federalism, supra note 9, at 338.
Swaine, Foreign Relations Federalism, supra note 9, at 338.
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War.101 These policies were held by individuals from every walk
of life and covered everything ìfrom life, property, and business
assets to vehicles, art, and future dowries for holdersí
daughters.î102 With the rise of the Nazi government in Germany
and the attendant persecution of the Jews, these insurance
policies and annuities became targets for confiscation.103 At first,
this confiscation was indirect. Jews were forced to cash out their
policies in order to pay the heavy taxes levied solely upon them
or to pay the steep emigration fees if they wanted to leave
Germany.104 However, following the night of November 9, 1938ó
also known as Kristallnachtóon which Jewish-owned businesses
throughout Germany were systematically looted and destroyed,
the Nazi government convinced insurance companies to pay
claims for damage arising out of the vandalism into the Reich
treasury at a fraction of the value of the claims.105 It was not
long before the German government began taking the policies of
Jews outright, and many insurance companies have been accused
of colluding with the Third Reich in this large-scale theft.106
After the end of World War II, insurance companies offered a
litany of excuses for their refusal to honor pre-war policies. They
pointed to ìthe destruction of company records during the
They cited claimantsí inability to produce death
war.î107
certificates for relatives who had died in concentration camps or
the fact that policyholders had stopped paying premiums when
they were deported to those camps.108 In some of the most
blatant cases, they informed claimants that they could not pay on
the policies because the proceeds had already been paidóto Nazi
officials.109 Insurance companies further argued that they were
relieved from paying on policies held in countries that became
Communist after the war because the insurance industries in
those countries had been nationalized.110

101 Michael J. Bazyler, The Holocaust Restitution Movement in Comparative
Perspective, 20 BERKELEY J. INTíL L. 11, 19 (2002) [hereinafter Bazyler, Holocaust
Restitution Movement].
102 Adrienne Scholz, Restitution of Holocaust Era Insurance Assets: Success or
Failure?, 9 NEW ENG. J. INTíL & COMP. L. 297, 299 (2003).
103 Bazyler, Holocaust Restitution Movement, supra note 101, at 19.
104 Michael J. Bazyler & Amber L. Fitzgerald, Trading with the Enemy: Holocaust
Restitution, the United States Government, and American Industry, 28 BROOK. J. INTíL L.
683, 703 (2003) [hereinafter Bazyler & Fitzgerald, Trading With the Enemy].
105 Bazyler, Holocaust Restitution Movement, supra note 101, at 19-20.
106 Michael J. Bazyler, Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in United
States Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 95-96 (2000) [hereinafter Bazyler, Nuremberg in
America].
107 Scholz, supra note 102, at 301.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Bazyler, Nuremberg in America, supra note 106, at 97.

SAUNDERS FINAL - MAY 28

2004]

5/28/2004 5:30 PM

An Iron Fist or Kid Gloves

292

This preoccupation with the realities of the Cold War seemed
to push the issue of reparations out of the spotlight, at least for a
time. With the exception of a few scattered, mostly unsuccessful
lawsuits in Europe on behalf of Holocaust victims and survivors
immediately following the end of the war, there was little activity
in this area until the 1990s and the fall of the Berlin Wall.111
In 1997, various Holocaust survivors and their heirs brought
federal and state suits in New York and California against over a
dozen insurance companies for their failure to pay claims.112
Many of the insurance companies prominent in Europe before
World War II are still prominent today and are, in fact, major
players in the United States insurance industry, among them
Assicurazioni Generali of Italy and Allianz of Germany.113 As a
result of this litigation and pressure from individual state
insurance commissioners, Generali and Allianz, along with three
other insurance companies, several foreign governments, and a
collection of international Jewish organizations formed the
International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims
(ICHEIC) in order to process the claims of Holocaust victims and
their heirs.114
In 1998, Congress also passed the Holocaust Assets
Commission Act, requiring state insurance commissioners to
investigate and create a record of insurance policies and other
assets from the Holocaust era.115 Furthermore, an agreement
finalized in 2000 between the German and American
governments allows for the creation of a fund to compensate
Holocaust victims and their heirs and provides a general promise
to comply with the procedures established by the ICHEIC.116 The
United States has negotiated similar agreements with Austria
and France with respect to stolen assets of Holocaust victims.117
These agreements, however, are not without their critics.
Insurance companies within the ICHEIC have a significant
amount of control over the processing of claims, resulting in
longer delays and smaller ultimate payouts than those yielded by
litigation.118 Additionally, early conflicts between the terms of
the U.S.-German agreement and the procedures established by
the ICHEIC have significantly hampered the ability of claimants
See Scholz, supra note 102, at 302-03.
Bazyler, Nuremberg in America, supra note 106, at 101-02. As of January 2000,
these claims were all either pending trial or had settled. Id. at 102.
113 Bazyler, Holocaust Restitution Movement, supra note 101, at 20.
114 Id. at 21.
115 Scholz, supra note 102, at 309.
116 Bazyler & Fitzgerald, Trading With the Enemy, supra note 104, at 708-09.
117 Id. at 698-700; Scholz, supra note 102, at 322.
118 Bazyler, Holocaust Restitution Movement, supra note 101, at 22.
111
112
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to receive compensation.119 Furthermore, the unwillingness of
the German and Austrian governments to make any reparations
as long as lawsuits are pending in American courts has also
complicated matters.120
Partly in response to Congressís enactment of the Holocaust
Act, California passed the HVIRA in 1999.121 According to the
declaration of the legislature, ì[s]urvivors are asking that
insurance companies come forth with any information they
possess that could show proof of insurance policies held by
Holocaust victims and survivors, in order to ensure that closure
on this issue is swiftly brought to pass.î122 The declaration goes
on to say that ì[i]nsurance companies . . . have a responsibility to
ensure that any involvement they or their related companies may
have had with insurance policies of Holocaust victims are
disclosed to the stateî and that the HVIRA ìis necessary to
protect the claims and interests of California residents, as well as
to encourage the development of a resolution to these issues
through the international process or through direct action by the
State of California, as necessary.î123
The HVIRA required ì[a]ny insurer currently doing business
in the state that sold life, property, liability, health, annuities,
dowry, educational, or casualty insurance policies, directly or
through a related company, to persons in Europe, which were in
effect between 1920 and 1945î to disclose information pertaining
to these aforementioned policies, including whether or not the
proceeds had been paid to the designated beneficiaries.124
Furthermore, failure on the part of an insurance company to
comply with the provisions of the HVIRA would result in the
suspension of that companyís authority to conduct insurance
business in California.125
It was not long before the HVIRA was challenged in the
courts. In 2000, several insurance entities brought suit arguing
the unconstitutionality of the statute by claiming that it violated
the federal foreign affairs power and the Foreign Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.126 On these grounds, a federal
district court granted a preliminary injunction against
Scholz, supra note 102, at 321.
Bazyler & Fitzgerald, Trading With the Enemy, supra note 104, at 700.
CAL. INS. CODE ß 13800 (Deering Supp. 2003).
Id. ß 13801(d).
Id. ß 13801(e), (f).
Id. ß 13804.
Id. ß 13806.
Gerling Global Reins. Corp. of Am. v. Quackenbush, No. CIV. S-00-0506, No. CIV.
S-00-0613, No. CIV. S-00-0779, No. CIV. S-00-0875, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8815, at *1213 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2000).
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
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enforcement of the HVIRA.127 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
rejected these claims but remanded the case to the district court
for consideration of the plaintiffsí due process claims.128 The
district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the
grounds that the HVIRA violated the insurance companiesí due
process rights.129 However, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit again
reversed the district court and upheld the constitutionality of the
HVIRA, ruling that it did not violate the foreign affairs power or
the Commerce Clause.130
Ultimately, though, the Supreme Court struck down the
HVIRA in Garamendi under the theory that it was preempted by
the express foreign policy of the federal government as embodied
in the executive agreements with Germany, France, and Austria
and by U.S. involvement in the ICHEIC.131
B.

The Majority Holding and its Reasoning

In deciding that the HVIRA was unconstitutional, the
majority focused on the significance of the executive agreements
between the United States and Germany, Austria, and France.132
The petitioners, the American Insurance Association and various
other insurance entities, as well as the United States government
and several foreign governments as amici curae, argued that the
HVIRA conflicted with the foreign policy expressed in these
The majority, favoring this argument, said
agreements.133
ì[t]here is, of course, no question that at some point an exercise of
state power that touches on foreign relations must yield to the
National Governmentís policy . . . .î134 They cited the ìconcern for
uniformityî that the framers of the Constitution expressed, as
evidenced by the writings of Alexander Hamilton and James
Madison in the Federalist Papers.135
The majority went on to say that, generally, there is no
question that ìthere is executive authority to decide what that
policy should be.î136 While admitting that the support for their
conclusion ìdoes not enjoy any textual detail,î they cited the
Constitutionís vesting of power in the Executive Branch and
127
128
129

Id. at *48.
Gerling Global Reins. Corp. of Am. v. Low, 240 F.3d 739, 754 (9th Cir. 2001).
Gerling Global Reins. Corp. of Am. v. Low, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1113 (E.D. Cal.

130
131
132
133
134
135
136

Gerling Global Reins. Corp. of Am. v. Low, 296 F.3d 832, 849 (9th Cir. 2002).
American Ins. Assín v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 2390 (2003).
Id. at 2386.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2001).
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several cases, including Curtiss-Wright, which generally support
the premise that there is executive authority to decide foreign
policy.137
More specifically, the majority considered the power of the
President to enter into executive agreements such as the ones
with Germany, Austria, and France.138 Citing Pink, they noted
that, starting with George Washington, Presidents have
negotiated executive agreements with foreign governments
without Senate approval or congressional challenge, and that the
practice has always been upheld by the courts.139 They also
dismissed the notion that executive agreements concerning
World War II-era insurance claims were less valid because they
took aim at foreign corporations rather than foreign governments
Justice Souter stated that ìuntangling
themselves.140
government policy from private initiative during war time is
often so hard that diplomatic action settling claims against
private parties may well be just as essential in the aftermath of
hostilities as diplomacy to settle claims against foreign
governments.î141
The majority thus concluded that ìvalid executive
agreements are fit to preempt state law, just as treaties
are . . . .î142 However, because the executive agreements did not
contain explicit preemption clauses, in order to determine the
actís constitutionality they were forced to examine whether the
executive agreements truly preempted the HVIRA.143
Continuing their inquiry, the majority turned to Zschernig.
They noted the Courtís claim in that case that ìour system of
government is such that . . . no less than the interest of the
people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal
power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free
from local interference.î144 This language echoes the broad
statements of national power in Curtiss-Wright and Hines.145
They also touched, however, on Justice Harlanís concurring
opinion in Zschernig and his disagreement over the idea of a
complete federal monopoly on foreign affairs, that for him a
ìconflicting federal policyî was necessary.146
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2387.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2388.
Id. (alterations in original).
See supra text accompanying notes 14, 18.
Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2389.
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ìIt is a fair question,î Justice Souter wrote, ìwhether respect
for the executive foreign relations power requires a categorical
choice between the contrasting theories . . . evident in the
Zschernig opinions,î but having brought up the question, Justice
Souter declined to answer.147 He reasoned that, under either
view, legislation ìin conflict with express foreign policy of the
National Governmentî would be preempted.148 The majority then
concluded that the HVIRA conflicted sufficiently with federal
policy as to be unconstitutional because it was clear from the
executive agreements with Germany and Austria that federal
policy mandated working within the procedures of the
ICHEIC.149 Citing Crosby, the majority noted that while the
goals and motivations of the state and federal governments
might have been similar, their approaches were not, and the
HVIRA had the potential for frustrating the implementation of
the federal policy by undermining the ICHEIC and annoying
Regardless of which was the better
European nations.150
approach, California could not be allowed to frustrate the
Presidentís diplomacy.151
Finally, the majority dismissed Californiaís argument, which
paralleled those in Barclays Bank: that Congress, in passing the
Holocaust Commission Act, condoned statutes such as the
HVIRA; and that Congress, with its power to regulate foreign
commerce, should control despite executive agreements to the
contrary.152 In so doing, the majority insisted that the President
took the ìlead roleî in foreign policy,153 and that the majorityís
reading of the Holocaust Commission Act did not authorize
anything in the HVIRA.154 In addition, the Court pointed out
that Congress had not acted in disapproval of the Presidentís
actions.155
C.

The Dissent

Justice Ginsburg, writing for the dissent, began by stating:
ìThe Presidentís primacy in foreign affairs . . . empowers him to
conclude executive agreements with other countries.î156 She also
agreed that such executive agreements have the power to
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2390.
Id. at 2392.
See id. at 2393.
Id. at 2394.
Id. at 2391 n.12.
Id. at 2394.
Id.
Id. at 2398 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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preclude state law.157 However, in such instances, she insisted
that the agreements be narrowly construed. Applying this
reasoning, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the executive
agreements with Germany, Austria, and France did not preclude
the HVIRA,158 that the United Statesí involvement in the
ICHEIC concerned the actual settlement of claims, and that the
HVIRA merely concerned disclosureóan issue which the
executive agreements did not address.159
Justice Ginsburg also took issue with the majorityís reliance
on Zschernig, saying, ìWe have not relied on Zschernig since it
was decided, and I would not resurrect that decision here.î160
She reasoned that Zschernig applies only to ìstate policy critical
She also disagreed with the
of foreign governments.î161
application of Pink and Crosby. In Crosby a federal statute was
implicated, not merely an executive agreement, and while an
executive agreement was at issue in Pink, it spoke directly
against the activity of the state of New York.162 In addition, she
dismissed the statements of executive officials against the
HVIRA, noting that similar statements of opinion were not
controlling in Barclays Bank.163 Justice Ginsburg felt that by
giving weight to such statements and by inferring preclusion
from the stated goals of the executive agreements, the Court was
overstepping its bounds.164 She concluded by saying, ìjudges
should not be the expositors of the Nationís foreign policy, which
is the role they play by acting when the President himself has not
taken a clear stand.î165
IV. STRETCHING DIRECT PREEMPTION TO ITS BREAKING POINT ñ
PROBLEMS WITH THE REASONING OF GARAMENDI
It is evident from both the majority and the dissenting
opinions in Garamendi that the Supreme Court favors the direct
preemption theory of federal supremacy in the realm of foreign
affairs. The majority, while seeming to pay homage to the
dormant federal foreign affairs power theory in Zschernig,
ultimately did not apply it, and the dissent was openly hostile to
the idea.166 Likewise, the majority dismissed the dormant
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2399 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2400 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2401 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2389, 2400 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Foreign Commerce Clause argument formulated in Barclays
Bank, noting that, in foreign policy, the President and not
Congress has the ìlead role.î167 The dissent did not even address
the issue, despite the fact that the Ninth Circuit decision was
based on the theory enumerated in Barclays Bank.168
However, the Courtís reliance in Garamendi on direct
preemption raises an issue: What is ìexpress foreign policy?î
Normally, this question is not so hard to answer. ìNo one
disputes that properly enacted treaties, statutes, and executive
acts have preemptive authority; as long as someone makes clear
what the law is, supremacy usually takes care of itself.î169 In
other words, the Supremacy Clause can easily be invoked if there
is a federal statute or treaty on point or an executive agreement
with a clear statement of its purpose and effect. As evidenced by
the deep division amongst the Justices in the Garamendi
decision, it is, however, questionable whether the Court had
before it such a clear statement of foreign policy.
When the courts look to something less authoritative than a
federal statute or treaty or a precisely stated executive
agreementóexecutive pronouncements, amici briefs, or even
mere silenceóto make a case for direct preemption, three
problems occur. First, the courts risk, as Justice Ginsburg
cautioned in Garamendi, overstepping their bounds.170 As stated
in the unanimous Crosby opinion, the details of foreign policy
Moreover, ìthe
belong to Congress and the President.171
Constitution does not make the judiciary the overseer of our
Simply stated, the judicial branch is not
government.î172
equipped to determine controversies related to foreign policy
based upon anything other than explicit statements of such
foreign policy from the other branches.
Second, in relying on documents such as congressional
reports, debate transcripts, amici briefs, and failed legislation, or
on silence for preemptive statements of foreign policy, the courts
allow Congress and the President to exceed their constitutional
powers.173 In Barclays Bank, the Supreme Court ruled that
Congressí acquiescence to Californiaís employment of the
worldwide combined reporting accounting method was enough of

Id. at 2391 n.12.
Gerling Global Reins. Corp. of Am. v. Low, 240 F.3d 739, 749 (9th Cir. 2001).
Swaine, Foreign Relations Federalism, supra note 9, at 343.
Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2401 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
530 U.S. at 386.
Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 512 U.S. 298, 330 (1994) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
173 Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 10, at 1156.
167
168
169
170
171
172
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a foreign policy statement to sanction Californiaís actions.174 In
Garamendi, Congressí silence was interpreted as support for the
Presidentís actions in making executive agreements with
Germany, Austria, and France and for the United Statesí
involvement in the ICHEIC.175 Given that the powers conferred
to the federal government in Articles I and II of the Constitution
are affirmative powers, there is little constitutional justification
for this practice.
Third, in looking beyond positive executive or congressional
statements to make a case for direct preemption, the Supreme
Court has initiated something of a ìturf warî between Congress
and the President over which is the ìone voiceî of foreign policy.
Under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause theory espoused in
Barclays Bank, the speaker is clearly Congress, and the Ninth
Circuitís decision relied on this Supreme Court determination.176
In concluding that the HVIRA did not violate the dormant
foreign affairs power or the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause,
the Ninth Circuit stated, ìOn the basis of the text, context, and
history of the Holocaust Act, we conclude that Congress was
aware of the statesí involvement in this area and, at least
implicitly, encouraged laws like HVIRA.î177 The decision in
Garamendi flew in the face of this statement. Despite the fact
that the sale of insurance clearly implicates foreign commerce,
the Supreme Court (whoís composition was virtually the same as
in Barclays Bank) dismissed the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause argument and handed the reigns of foreign policy back to
the President.178 Such inconsistency undermines the ability of
the court to provide the lower courts and the states with a
workable rule.
V.

VINDICATING ZSCHERNIG ñ A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF
THE FEDERAL MONOPOLY ON FOREIGN POLICY AND ITS
APPLICATION TO GARAMENDI

Given the apparent failure of the direct preemption theory in
the absence of a federal law or treaty or a clear statement of
policy, a workable rule is desperately needed to provide
consistent direction to the lower courts. Despite the Supreme
Courtís seeming disdain for Zschernig, that case may very well
provide the solution. After all, even a vague rule is better than
no rule at all. By abandoning the precedent set in Zschernig, the
174
175
176
177
178

512 U.S. at 327-28.
123 S. Ct. at 2394.
512 U.S. at 331.
Gerling Global Reins. Corp. of Am. v. Low, 240 F.3d 739, 749 (9th Cir. 2001).
123 S. Ct. at 2391 n.12.
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Supreme Court has left lower courts to fend for themselves,
resulting in ìany number of tests rules [sic] and standards.î179
In addition, though there is little constitutional support for a
broad foreign affairs power, it is not completely without
constitutional basis.180 Given the demonstrated practicality of
having a unified foreign policy, it seems prudent to have a
mechanism for curtailing state activity.
Moreover, while Congress or the President could preempt a
state law at any time through a positive pronouncement, the
damage to foreign relations is often already done. Applying a
dormant foreign affairs test allows the judiciary to more
efficiently curtail the damaging activity, especially in potentially
inflammatory situations.181 One of the criticisms of Zschernig is
that its reasoning seems to be based upon a uniquely Cold War
mentality and that it is simply no longer applicable to todayís
Legal scholars have argued that increasing
world.182
globalization has blurred, and in some cases erased, the line
between strictly local and foreign affairs, and that the end of the
Cold War has made foreign retaliation for state actions less likely
and judicial intervention less necessary.183 However, the events
of recent years have shown how quickly the world can change.
Those who shrug off Zschernig as nothing more than a relic of a
tense, paranoid time in our national history do so at their own
peril.
Granted, the danger in applying the Zschernig ìdirect
impactî testóthat the courts will overstep their authorityóstill
exists. As laid out, the outcome of a Zschernig analysis ìturns on
a courtís independent assessment of its foreign relations
However, adding two more layers to the
implications.î184
analysis would diminish this danger greatly. First, when looking
for a ìdirect impact,î courts should focus not on any specific
foreign policy that Congress or the President has chosen but
rather on the powers contained in Articles I and II of the
Constitution. For instance, the Court should ask whether the
state action in question would have a direct impact on the federal
governmentís ability to regulate foreign commerce or to wage
war. Doing so removes the Courtís focus from the meaning of
congressional silence or the implications of low-level executive
statements and places that focus on the area of greatest judicial
179
180
181
182
183
184

Chiang, supra note 8, at 967.
See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
See Spiro, supra note 36, at 1242.
See Goldsmith, supra note 52, at 1663.
See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 36, at 1247.
Goldsmith, supra note 52, at 1637.
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competenceóinterpreting the provisions of the federal
Constitution. Second, the court should only strike down a state
law under the Zschernig test when the danger of leaving it intact
is greater. Such a requirement gives deference to the legislative
and executive branches while allowing for swift action when
necessary.
As previously mentioned, the Ninth Circuit in Deutsch v.
Turner Corp. applied something similar to this modified
Zschernig test to the California law in question in that case.185
In applying Zschernig, it backed off from the sweeping
Further
statements of federal power found in Pink.186
examination reveals that the court based this exclusive power on
several of the enumerated powers concerning the conduct of war
found in Articles I and II of the Constitution, and not on some
vague general notion of federal foreign affairs power.187 The
court noted that the California law, because it implicated the
ability of the United States to negotiate the end of hostilities as
World War II drew to a close, was provocative by its nature and
would be dangerous if allowed to stand.188
Using Deutsch v. Turner Corp. as a model for a Zschernig
analysis of the HVIRA, the Court should first look at the specific
bases for federal power which come into play. For instance,
Congress has the ability to regulate foreign commerce, and
ìstatutes that ëmainly involve foreign commerceí are among those
least likely to be held invalid under the foreign affairs power.î189
Several states also filed a joint amicus brief in support of the
HVIRA in Garamendi in which they explained that insurance is
clearly a matter of commerce governed by Congress and that,
ìCongress was aware of the state activities in question . . . .
Congress has not acted to stop those state efforts. To the
contrary, Congressóthrough the U.S. Holocaust Assets
Commission Act of 1998, and congressional statementsóhas
encouraged the States to continue their efforts.î190 In addition,
the states argued that HVIRA has only an incidental effect on
foreign policy.
They said, ì[t]he HVIRA is directed to
corporations, not governments. It does not turn upon the policies
or structures of foreign governments. Moreover, its application is

185
186
187
188
189

2001)).

Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 709-11 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 710.
Id. at 712.
Id. at 711.
Id. (quoting Gerling Global Reins. Corp. of Am. v. Low, 240 F.3d 739, 753 (9th Cir.

190 Brief for the States of California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at
15, American Ins. Assín v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374 (2003) (No. 02-722).
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not only evenhanded, but is also ministerial.î191 Furthermore,
the Court in Deutsch argued that the ìHVIRA does not attempt
to hold defendants liable for their past wartime conduct; it
therefore does not implicate the exclusive power of the federal
government to make and resolve war.î192 If these assertions are
true, then the HVIRA does not meet the ìdirect impactî test.
On the other hand, the requirements of the HVIRA may
come into conflict with the Presidentís ability to negotiate with
other nations as bestowed by the Treaty Power. The United
Statesí amicus brief filed in support of the petitioner insurance
entities in Garamendi said, ìHVIRA has generated the very
tensions in international relations that the United States has
sought to avoid, prompting protests from the governments of
Germany and Switzerland concerning HVIRAís application to
insurance policies written in those countries.î193 Furthermore,
the brief cautioned:
State government officials, who are not part of the process
through which the Nation formulates and conducts its
international relations, are not well positioned to evaluate
what adverse impact their actions may have for those
relations. They cannot, for example, be expected to make an
informed assessment of whether, or how, or when a foreign
government might respond to provocative state legislation, or
how detrimental the response might be to various important
interests of the United States as a whole.194

In addition, many of the prohibitions on the states in the
Constitution can be viewed as aimed at preventing war, and in
this light, any provocative state action flies in the face of these
prohibitions and conflicts with the federal governmentís War
Powers.195 The government of Germany, in its amicus brief filed
in opposition to the HVIRA, stated that ìthe HVIRA offends
German and U.S. sovereignty. Californiaís law is particularly
offensive to Germany in light of the lawís clear implication that
the Federal Republic is either incapable or unwilling to achieve
the proper resolution of unpaid Holocaust-era insurance
claims.î196 Clearly the German government regards the HVIRA
as a provocative state action causing tension in U.S.-German
relations and implicating the federal governmentís War Powers.
Id. at 19 (emphasis omitted).
Deutsch, 324 F.3d at 716.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 18,
Garamendi (No. 02-722).
194 Id.
195 Deutsch, 324 F.3d at 711.
196 Brief for the Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 19, Garamendi (No. 02-722).
191
192
193
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Therefore, a strong case exists that the HVIRA has a ìdirect
impactî on the power of the federal government to conduct
foreign policy.
If the Court were to determine that the HVIRA had a ìdirect
impactî on the federal governmentís ability to conduct foreign
policy based upon the statuteís implication of the Treaty Power
and the War Powers, then the Court should continue the analysis
by looking at the relative danger of allowing the HVIRA to stand.
For example, the United Statesí amicus brief stated, ìIt is not for
respondents to trivialize the potential implications of [foreign
governmentsí] protests for United States foreign policy, especially
at a time of international tension when relations between this
Nation and its European allies are at their most sensitive.î197
Given the great desire to avoid harming the United Statesí
relationships with its European allies any further and the
importance of those relationships, the Court could deem the
danger great enough to invalidate the HVIRA without resorting
to the tortured application of the direct preemption theory found
in Garamendi.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is clear from history and from the enumerated powers
found in Article I and II of the Constitution that the federal
government has substantial power to conduct foreign policy.
While the rationale for a complete federal monopoly on foreign
policy lacks substantial support, the Supreme Court acts on
equally shaky ground in rejecting Zschernig and stretching the
idea of direct preemption to its breaking point to strike down
state laws that interfere with the federal governmentís ability to
conduct foreign policy.
The decision in Garamendi illustrates the shortcomings of
the direct preemption approach. In the absence of a federal law,
treaty, or other official pronouncement, the Court is forced to
look at other, less official sources for preemptive language, a
practice which does nothing to diminish the danger of the
judiciary interfering in the foreign policy prerogative of Congress
or the President. In addition, by being inconsistent as to whether
the Congress or the President has the final word on foreign policy
determinations, the Supreme Court has left lower courts and
state governments without guidance.
The Zschernig test is not so vague that it cannot be applied.
Deutsch v. Turner Corp. illustrates such an analysis, and with
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Brief for the United States at 18, Garamendi (No. 02-722) (citations omitted).
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additional safeguardsónarrowly construing the powers of the
federal government and weighing the danger of allowing the law
in question to standóthe Zschernig test could easily have been
applied to the HVIRA.

